The Mobile IP protocol has evolved from providing mobility support for portable computers to support for wireless handheld devices with high mobility patterns. A new categoly of micromobility protocols has been proposed to deal with the increased signaling loads that will he generated with large populations of such devices on a network. We argue that the authentication schemes presently employed in these networks' do not scale well for large numbers of nodes, and that the lack of accounting procedures prevents the mass deployment of these networks. We envisage that future access networks will he operated by independent service providers, who will charge users for access to services in the fixed network but may not have long-term contractual relationships with them. These access networks may also employ a variety of micromobility protocols for fast handover support. We present a scheme based on hash chains, which allows for fast authentication of datagrams for secure updating of router entries within the access network, and real-time accounting of network usage by mobile nodes. Such a system will alleviate problems of fraud in mobile networks and eliminate the need for interoperator billing agreements.
INTRODUCTION
The Mobile IP protocol [l] was designed with a view of supporting mobile hosts with relatively slow mobility patterns. In Mobile-IP-based networks, users have an enduring relationship with a network operator, and interoperator roaming agreements are required to allow mobile users to access resources in third-party networks. Payment for usage of network resources may take place after the services are used, and call detail records (CDRs) must be exchanged by the oper-' ators for hilling purposes. In the future; when the number of mobile users and network operators becomes large, these existing approaches to authentication and billing in Mobile IP networks will not be sufficient.
The mobility of small handheld communica- (IETF) . In this article, we outline a lightweight scheme to address the security issues in Mobile-IP-based next-generation wireless networks. Our proposal allows a user to arrive in a new access network and avail themselves of network services by paying the service provider in real time. The routing nodes within the access network are able to efficiently verify the authentication and accounting information carried in the datagrams during a call. In the remainder of this article, we give a brief overview of Mobile IP and some of the well-known micromobility architectures that have been proposed. We then discuss the current approaches to security in Mobile-IP-based networks, followed by an ideal set of mobility requirements for next-generation networks. We provide details of our proposed protocol and finally present some concluding remarks.
MOBILITY SUPPORT IN IP NETWORKS
The IETF Mobile IP protocol is a well-known approach for mobility support in IP networks. It allows a mobile node (MN) to maintain its existing transport layer connections when it moves from one subnetwork to another. Mobile IP is a network-layer protocol that is completely transparent to the higher layers, and does not require any changes to the existing Internet hosts o r routers. In normal IP routing, packets are routed from a source to a destination on a hop-by-hop basis, where a router makes a routing decision based on the network part of the address. Thus, an IP address is used for routing and also specifies a point of attachment for a node on the Internet. For a host to continue to receive packets while it is roaming in a foreign network, it needs to keep its I P address. Mobile IP solves this problem by adopting a two-tier addressing approach. In a Mobile IP network, a roaming MN has two network addresses. T h e first is known as the h o m e address, and remains unchanged regardless of where the node is attached on the Internet. The second is knownas !he care-of address (CoA) and changes at each new point of attachment in the network. An MN using its home address appears t o be able to receive packets in a foreign network through a node in the home network known as the home agent (HA).
When a host roams into a foreign network it obtains a new CoA, which it registers with its HA. Registration messages must be authenticated by the HA, prior to any updates to the CoA for an MN. Unauthenticated signaling messages can allow a malicious host to trick an MN's HA into adding a false CoA for the node, and result in datagrams being redirected to an unknown network by the HA. In Mobile IPv4, the router in the visited network that cooperates with the HA t o deliver datagrams to an MN is known as the foreign agent (FA). When the HA receives datagrams for a roaming MN, it tunnels them to the node using the CoA as the destination IP address. The FA detunnels the packets to reveal the MN's original home address and forwards them to t h e node. S i n c e the packets arrive at the MN with their home address as the destination, they are processed correctly by the upper layers.
Mobile IP solves the macromobility problem in wide area networks by updating the CoA at the H A whenever a mobile host changes its point of attachment on the Internet. Rapid proliferation in the number of wireless devices and networks has led to considerable research into micromobility protocols in both academia and industry. The main aim of these protocols is to minimize the number of signaling messages that have to be carried over the core network to support host mobility. Micromobility architectures support mobility within a local network or domain. With Mobile IP, any change in a MN's point of attachment results in a signaling message being sent to the home network, even though most of the path between the MN and the H A remains unchanged. On the other hand, with micromobility protocols, local handoffs result in signaling messages being generated that are limited to the administrative domain in which the MN is currently roaming. The signaling messages are intercepted by a gateway node or router, which usually also acts as the CoA for the MN. As long as an MN remains within the administrative domain of a single operator or service provider, there is n o n e e d to u p d a t e its r o u t e entry in the home network. Only when a n M N moves between two separate networks does one need to employ the Mobile IP protocol.
CELLULAR IP
Cellular IP [3] is a micromobility protocol based on cellular telephony concepts such as passive connectivity, paging, and support for fast intradomain handover for mobile nodes. A Cellular IP (CIP) network consists of a number of interconnected routers and radio endpoints. The are usually the base stations, and the ttachment to the Internet is a host the gateway. T h e gateway n o d e embodies both the H A and F A functionality, and is responsible for filtering out all signaling messages that are specific to the CIP network. Data packets transmitted by an MN are routed toward the gateway on a hop-by-hop basis. Each intermediate CIP node creates a mapping of the address of the MN and the neighbor that forwarded the packet in its route cache. As long as the MN has data to send, the CIP nodes along the path to the gateway keep an up-to-date mapping for the MNs point of attachment on the network. In cases where an MN does not have any data to send but wishes to maintain a valid route cache entry, it periodically sends a route update message toward the gateway node. Page and route update messages can be used to create entries within the Cellular I P caches, which can result in changes to the routing of packets within the network. A CIP node must therefore authenticate all signaling messages prior to any cache modifications. Cellular I P employs a fast session-key management scheme that allows authentication of control packets by CIP nodes by making use of a shared network key. This aids fast handoffs within the access network but also has some drawbacks. All CIP nodes have knowledge of the network key, and repeated use of the same can lead to a decrease in the effective security of the key. Data packets can refresh a cache entry but are not required to be authenticated by a CIP node. A malicious node can inject data packets into the network and keep cache entries alive to disrupt traffic flows. T h e r e are n o mechanisms in place to account for network usage within a C I P network. Once a node stops transmitting signaling or data packets, the cache entries expire and are deleted by a CIP node. All records of the MN having ever been present on the network are subsequently lost.
HIERARCHICAL MOBILE IP
The Hierarchical Mobile IP (HMIP) protocol [4] makes use of a hierarchy of FAs, which allow an MN to register locally within a visited domain. This reduces the number of signaling messages that have to be sent to the home network and also improves handover performance, since it minimizes the latency associated with updating the CoA with an H A in a possibly distant network. When a n MN first arrives in a new domain, it performs a registration with its home network and registers the address of the gateway F A (GFA) as its CoA. When the M N moves between FAs under the same GFA, localized or regional updates take place while t h e C o A remains the same. There are a number of similarities in the design and operation of the above mentioned micromobility protocols [6]. We also observe that in each of the above protocols there are certain key nodes o r routers that maintain a route cache, which holds soft-state mappings of the c u r r e n t location of mobiles within the access network. Regardless of how the cache' is structured, a router must authenticate all signaling messages it receives from a MN prior to any cache modifications. Second, an MN usually has a security association with its home network and must establish a temporary security association in the access network. This may involve t h e use of a trusted key-distribution server or a dialog with the home network. T o aid fast handoffs and maintain quality of service (QoS), t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t o contact a r e m o t e entity must he kept to a minimum.
Finally, there is a gateway or domain router, which connects the access network to a core network such as the Internet. This node can he used to collate accounting information of network usage by roaming MNs.
AAA AND SECURITY
The AAA working group within the IETF has been working on the definition of a general infrastructure for network access. Recently the work has been adapted t o support the Mobile IP protocol, to allow for. authentication and collection of accounting information of network usage by MNs [7] . Figure 1 shows the entities involved in authenticating and registering an MN in a foreign network using the AAA infrastructure. A foreign domain contains one o r more AAA servcrs (AAAF) and multiple FAs. The FAs interact with an MN to authenticate its credentials. An FA has a security association with its local AAA server, which in turn may have further security associations with other AAA servers. If the AAAF cannot verify the credcntials of an MN, it can contact the MN's home AAA server (AAAH) with whom it must share a security association.
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A security association at a very minimum consists of a shared secret between two entities. In the AAA trust model for Mobile IP, an MN shares a security association SA, with the AAA server in its home domain. T h e AAAH in turn shares a security association SA2 with the HA. It is also necessary for the AAAH and AAAF t o share a security association SA, so that the AAA server in the foreign domain can verify the credentials of a roaming MN: Finally, the FA. must share a security association SA4 with the AAAF in order to allocate local resources to an MN. For scalability rcasons the concept of brokers (AAAB) is emplnycd, which means that a foreign domain does not need to keep security associations with every,possible home domain. T h e use of brokers in the system r e q u i r e s t h a t the two administrative domains have security associations with the broker. The broker then becomes privy to security cxchangcs between the two domains and also has to be trusted.
Once an MN has been authenticated, three session keys are generated by the AAAH. Each session key that is generated by the AAAH is generally distributed to two entities. The method by which the key is encoded depends on the security association hetween the entities. The mobile-home keyKMN,+, is shared bchvecn the Verify hash values as they arrive pU Figure 2 . Micropayments using hash chains.
MN and the HA. It is encrypted using security association SA, for the HA and SA1 for the MN. For MNs currently roaming in a foreign networkl this key has to be transported via the AAAF and thc serving FA in the foreign network. The mobile-foreign key KMN,Fa is shared hetwecn the M N and the FA. It is encrypted using SA3 for the FA and SA1 for the MN: The AAAF forwards the key to the correct FA using security association SA+ Finally, the foreignhome key KFA,wa is shared hetwecn the FA and the HA. It is encrypted using SA3 for the F A and SA2 for thc HA. Oncc the session keys have been distributed, there is no need to invoke the AAA protocols until the keys expire. During intradomain handover the new FA will contact the AAAF and obtain the session keys K M N ,~~ and Kfa,Ha, which were previously assigned to the old FA. From the above discussion it becomes increasingly clear that the overheads incurred in setting up the AAA security associations and the transferring of cryptographic material can he quite substantial. In micromobility environments, where an MN may change its point of attachment within the acccss network frequcntly, this may lead to degradation in the QoS since routers in the new path will need to be informed of the existing security associations prior to making any routing decisions. In addition, ioterdomain handover requires that the MN obtain a new set of sessions keys from the AAAH server and havc them distributed to all entitics concerned. We now present a lightweight cryptographic technique that allows us to address some of thcse problems. MICROPAYMENTS USING HASH CHAINS A user gcneratcs a hash chain of length N by appplying'a hash function N times to a random value PN the root of the hash chain, to obtain a final hash Po, the anchor of the hash chain. The user commits to the chain by digitally signing the anchor with hisiher privatc key. For each payment, the user releases thepre-image of the last hash value. For example, for the first payment the user releases the hash value P I . The receiver can apply the same hash function to the value PI to obtain the anchor Po. Since the hash function is one-way, only the user could have generated the hash value. Figure 2 shows the overall payment process where a user generates a hash chain of length N . The user commits to the anchor of the chain Po, thc length of the chain, the value of each hash, and the vendor at which heishe wishes to spend the chain. Prior to payment the user forwards the commitment to the vendor, who can verify its authenticity offline. For each micropayment the user releases the next payment hash in the chain. The vendor can redeem the hashes at the broker with whom the user has an account at a . later date hy presenting the highest payment hash along with the signed commitment.
MICROPAYMENT TECHNOLOGY

UNBALANCED ONE-WAY BINARY TREE (UOST)
The UOBT schcme is an efficient hash chain scheme where the root of each chain is derived from another hash chain [IO] . The schemc is ideal when a largc number of hashes are needed and the device has limited storage capabilities. Only thc lree root valuc has to be stored on the device to be able to reconstruct the entire UOBT. Figure 3 shows an example UOBT where On small devices with limited storage such as a PDA, it may not be possible to store all the hash values of a long hash chain. If a UOBT is used with a backbone chain length equal to the length of each subchain, it can he shown that the average computational overhcad to compute the next hash is n l / Z -1 , where n is the number of values in the UOBT, and n1I2 is the square root of n. Thus, a 100 x 100 UOBT requires 99 hashes on average to compute a hash value. There is a n initial overhcad in transporting the set of anchors to thc broker for the commitment to be signed. However, oncc the initial exchange has taken place, the number of cryptographic operalions perfonncd during thc mmmunicativns session are greatly reduced.
PROTOCOL OVERVIEW
Wc envisage that in the future, there will he a large number of indepcndcnt network operators and service providers, who will provide users with wireless access to o t h e r fixed or mobile nodes on thc lntcrnet. Thcse access networks will have dedicated. high-spced connections via a gateway (GW) node into the corc IP network. Small or medium-sized networks may consist of a numbcr of radio cells and may support micromobility protocols for fast handovcr within the access nctwork. Each user in the system will he uniquely identifiable by hislher nctwork access identifier [ l l ] which is of the form user@rcalm. A user who arrives in a new access network can immediately start accessing services in the core nctwork oncc helshe has registered with the service provider and bought provider-specific payment tokens from a trusted brokcr (BK). In o r d e r to be able to.receive incoming calls, a user must registcr hislher CoA with hislher preferred location management server (LS). The LS keeps a mapping of the user's network access identifier (NAI) to hislher current CoA. Figure 4 shows the entities that make up the system.
A scrvice provider (SP) gencrates revenue by charging for usage of nctwork resources from roaming mobiles and may also provide other value-added services. Wc employ micropayment technology, which allows the routers within the access network to authenticate datdgrams prior to making a routing decision and the SP tp be paid in rcal time for service provision. This eliminates the need f o r any longlived contiacts between thc M N a n d t h e operators. Existing credit-based mobile hilling systems trust users to pay their bills based on strong identity verification and credit history checks. They also place total trust in the operator to bill the user for thc correct amount, but provide no mechanisms to prove thc authenticity of the C D R s generated by the operator. Unlimitcd credit with post-fact punishment is too opcn to ahuse in mobile networks. With a largc population of mobile uscrs and indcpendent network opcrators, i t is desirahle t o remove the need to trust them and thercby minimize fraud in the system.
A mobile uscr registers with the SP to obtain a unique nctwork address for thc access network in which heishe currently finds himlhcrself. This address scwes as the new CoA for the user while heishe remains in thc access network. The user subsequently purchases provider-specific payment tokens from hisiher BK via the GW node, as payment for using resources in the access network. The GW authenticates the BK commitment and broadcasts the payment details to the routing nodes within the access network. In order to he able to receive incoming calls, the
MN sends an authenticated update of its new
CoA to its chosen LS. It also attaches the numher of payment tokens thc location Server rcquires to keep the CoA informalion alive within its databasc.
In addition to the existing fixed servcrs in thc nehvork, we now have a new category of mobile users and thereforc handle data calls differcntly
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IEEE Communications Magazine * Fcbruary 2003 from voice calls. To make a data call, the MN obtains the IP address of the destination node by querying a domain name server (DNS), and forwards datagrams toward the destination via the GW node'in the access network. For voice calls, the MN first pays its LS to obtain the current CoA for the correspondent node, and then forwards datagrams to the CN via the gateway. In each case, the MN attaches the required amount of payment tokens along with each datagram, to enable them to be transported through the access network. T h e hash values also perform a n authentication function, and are used by the routing nodes within t h e access network to update their soft-state route mappings for roam-, ing MNs. The payment parameters are removed by t h e G W node prior t o releasing the datagrams into t h e core network. T h e service provider periodically deposits the highest payment hash in each chain used by an MN with its BK to redeem payment for network usage,
DESIGN GOALS
T h e transition from macro-to micromobilitybased architectures has been outlined along with the associated security issues. A vision of the architecture of future Mobile-IP-based access networks has also been presented. We now discuss the design goals of our authentication and accounting solution for Mobile-IP-based networks.
Real-Time Payment -A mobile user should be able to pay in real time for network usage in an access network without the need to contact a home nitwork. Furthermore, if the location management functionality can be provided as a paid service by a VASP, subscription with a home operator can be completely removed. By. removing the need for subscription-based billing and location management, the requirement for a home network can be eliminated.
Authentication and Router Updates.-Users should not.have to maintain a separate security relationship with each access network they may use from time to time. In addition, signaling messages transmitted by an MN in order to add or update the soft-state routing entries within the routers in the access network must be quickly and efficiently authenticated. This should h e d o n e without t h e need for extensive key exchanges between the various entities or the need to contact a third party.
Lightweight Cryptographic ProceduresAuthentication and accounting related cryptographic data that accompanies datagrams in the access network should he kept to a minimum. This will lead to fast processing of datagrams prior to routing and minimize storage requirements on intermediate nodes. Nodes outside the access network should not have to understand .the mobility or payment messagcs. Packets that traverse the core network should appear as normal IP datagrams to intermediate routing nodes.
Offline Payment Verification -There should he no need to contact a third party to verify the validity of payment tokens by an accepting enti- ty. The payee should be able io prcsent the payment tokens at a later date to a BK and be guaranteed payment. Thcre should be multiple BKs in the system, which allows paymcnt tokens to be redeemable at the recipient's BK who in turn trusts the issuing BK.
Identified Payment Tokens -Payment tokens should redeemable only by the specified entity. This will prevent double-spending of tokens by cheating nodes or eavesdroppers in the network.
Personal Mobility -A user should be reachable using a globally.unique identifier and be able to obtain an access-network-specific address on demand. The payment tokens and associated security keys for a user can be stored on a smart card. This allows them to be used in any mobile device owned or rented by the user. However, the smart card should he used purely as a secure portable device, and there should be no dependency on the cryptographic hardware to maintain the security of the system. Location Privacy -The location o f a mobile user should be known to as few entities as possible in the system. One should be required to pay an LS to obtain the current CoA for a user. This will minimize the number of unsolicitcd messages sent to a node.
In brief, we wish to remove unnecessaly trust from the system, reduce the online communications overhead of contacting a home network, and allow real-time payment for usage of network rcsources anywhere by anyonc who holds valid payment tokens.
REGISTRATION IN THE ACCESS NETWORK
O n entering or waking up in a new access network, an MN's first task is to obtain a network address. It first obtains the address of the GW node, which is periodically advertised hy the base stations in the network, and scnds a registration request to it. The MN identifies itsclf by attaching a digitally signed copy of its NAI and a timestamp, and uses a null I P address a s its initial source address. An M N is issued an NAI when it establishes an association with an LS. It may additionally get its public key certificd by the LS o r any other widely known TTP. T h c G W returns a unique network-specific address, along with its charge details for network usage signed with its private key in response. T h e charge details at a very minimum may specify the charge for carrying data and voice traffic to and'from the core network. Figure 5 shows thc datagram format, which contains an additional header we refer to as the mobility header, and the message exchanges between the mobile and G W nodes, The mobility and payment-related fields are kept within the mohility header and are required only by the,nodes within the access network. The mobility header is removed by the G W node prior to any datagrams leaving the access network.
PAYMENT CHAIN PURCHASE FROM A BROKER
Prior t o making any calls, an M N must purchase access-nctwork-specific payment tokens from its BK, whom the service provider must also trust. The MN generates a UOBT of the desired length from a secret tree root to obtain, for example, the set of anchors {Plo ... PlOOo}.
The secret roots of the UOBT from which the individual subchains are generatcd do not Icave the user's device during the chain purchase protocol. The payment chains of thc U O B T can only bc spent at the specified SP and have no monetary value until committed to by a BK. To obtain this commitment, the M N attaches a macropayment for the broker in the PurchaseRequest message. T h e request is sent to the G W node in t h e access network, which forwards it t o the identified broker (BK2) and monitors the reply.
The message consists of the payment details such as the NAI of the user, the identity of the SP where the chains a r e to h e spent, and the UOBT identifier along with the set of anchors, the length of each chain, and the value of a payment tokcn in the chain. The payment details are signed with thc private key of the user, the authenticity of which the BK can verify. T h e macropayment is encrypted with the public key of the BK, which ensures that no unauthorircd entity is able to access the paymcnt details during transit. T h e M N and BK already possess each other's public key certificates, since they have a pre-established accounting rclationship. Figure 6 shows the payment chain purchasc protocol in detail.
T h e BK commits t o ;he hash chains o r promises to honor their value by digitally signing the payment chain commitment (Comm), consisting of the payment details sent by the user and an expiry date associated with thc chains. The commitment shows that each payment hash from t h e chains reprcsents a prepaid.valuc redcemahle at t h e BK. T h e commitmcnt is returned t o the user via the G W node in the access network. The G W verifies the BK commitment, and broadcasts the relevant payment details (Auth) to all internal routing nodes in the access network. T h e payment dctails a r e stored in an authcntication cache (Auth Cache) in each router. Hash tokens are rcleased subsequently to the SP by the MN, and scrvc as payment throughout the duration of a call. Since thc hash tokens are generated using a one-way function, they can seme the dual purpose of authentication. They a r e used by the routers in the ~C C C S S network to authenticate signaling messages and datagrams, prior to updating thcir route cache entry for an MN. If thc MN already possesses valid payment tokens for the access network, it may prescnt these to the G W nodc, who can authenticate the same and broadcast the relevant details to the routing nodes within the ~C C C S S network.
LOCATION MANAGEMENT
In order t o rcceive incoming calls, a user must periodically update hisher CoA details at hisiher GW returns the signed broker commitment to the MN. {GWl, 1. Gateway-Authorization, (Auth)SigGwl)
GW broadcasts the payment details in the access network.
Broker returns a signed commitment. Binds the anchor of the payment chains to the identity of the GW node by digitally signing the message -I Figure 6 . Payment chain purchase.
LS from the user's NAI, and obtain the current CoA for the user. Figure 7 shows the sequence of steps involved in the process. The MN sends a message to its~LS via the G W node in the access network. T h e mobility header contains a payload identifier . ( D a t a ) , the U O B T identifier (UOBTID), a hash token (PX,) a s payment for nctwork usage in the access network, the suhchain number X, and the hash number Y. Intermediate routing nodes verify the authenticity of the hash token by hashing back to the last hash value stored in their Auth Cache: A valid hash value allows them to add to o r update both their authentication and route caches. T h e Auth Cache always contains the last valid hash token received by the node. This aids in fast verification of the hash tokens sincc a node is not required to hash hack to the anchor of the chain each time. The G W node removes the mobility header and forwards the payload to the specified destination address. The datagram is treated as a regular IP datagram by routers in the core network. The contents of the payload are decrypte d by LS2 t o reveal a Location-Updatc message, which contains the new CoA for the user. The user also attaches the required hash tokens a s payment to the LS for hosting this information. T h e payment tokens are from a separate UOBT that the user purchased previously in order to spend at the LS. Alternatively, a user may have an accounting relationship with an LS. Heishe may he required to digitally sign the Location-Update message so that the LS can verify its authenticity and debit histher account.
CALL DELIVERY: DATA
From time to time a nodc may wish to contact other fixed nodes in the core network, such as a Web server or a VASP. The address of such a server is well known and remains unchanged over a period of time. T h e M N may query a DNS to obtain the IP address of the server, and may need to pay the SP for the same. Once the MN has the network address of the server, it attaches the required payment tokens along with each datagram t o be transported through the access network towards the destination. lntermediate routing nodes on the path to the gateway can authenticate the hash tokens, by hashing back t o t h e last stored hash value in their authentication cache. The G W as before removes the mobility hcader and forwards the datagrams.
Note that to pay the SP multiple hash tokens, the MN does not have to attach multiple hash values. Instead it can just attach the correct hash value further up the chain. Sending PI5 after P11 is the equivalent of sending four payment hashes, P1z-PIs, since they can he obtained from PI5 by repeatedly applying the correct hash function. Also, since the datagrams a r e handled in the normal manner by intermediate routers in the core network a s well as the destination node, existing applications can he used without modification. The charge details the MN negotiated with thc SP for accessing data services in the core nctwork allow for a negotiated amount of data to he delivered to the MN in response to a request. However, the G W node can at any stage demand that the MN release furthcr payment Figure 8 shows the message exchanges when the MN moves between base stations. Prior to moving, the MN was using the first subchain (Pl), and the last hash.vdlue it released was the S3rd (P153) hash in that chain. When the MN changes base stations, it transmits a datagram with the hash value (P157) from the P1 chain. Any new routers in the path toward the GW node veritj the hash value by hashing back to the current subchain anchor (Plo) and consult their Auth Cache. However, existing routers in the new path to the gateway only hash hack to the last stored hash value (Plss) in their Auth Cache. I t has been shown that an ordinary desktop machine can perform over 100,000 hash operationsls. Therefore, there should only be a minimum amount of delay in setting up the new path in the access.network.
If an MN has no data to send hut wishes to keep its route entries alive in the access network, it can forward the required number of hash tokens with a network-specific keep alive message.
CALL DELIVERY: VOICE
Whenever a user wishes to make a voice call to another user in the network, the MN must first obtain t h e c u r r e n t C o A for t h e destination node. The MN does this by requesting its LS to obtain the CoA from the correspondent node's (CN's) LS, LS1, which can he identified from t h e NAI of t h e CN ( c n @ l s l . n e t ) . T h e ' M N transmits a datagram destined for its LS, LS2, via the G W node, the payload of which contains a Location-Request.message. As f a r as the GW is concerned, the MN has transmitted another data packet and it needs to validate t h e payment tokens. T h e GW.removes t h e mobility h e a d e r a n d forwards t h e p a c k e t toward the destination. Thc MN's LS decrypts the contents of the payload t o reveal a Location-Request message from the MN, along with the payment tokens required by it to complete the operation. T h e LS uses t h e NAIcN field in the message to obtain the address of the LS that hosts the CoA information for the CN. It sends its own location request message to LSl asking it for the current CoA for the CN along with a micro or macropayment for LS1. LS1 rcsponds with a Location-Response message, which is forwarded to the MN. The details arc signed with t h e private key o f L S l a n d cncrypted with the recipient's public key so that interm e d i a t e n o d e s a r e n o t able t o o b t a i n any details of the whereabouts of a n MN. Once the MN has the network address of the CN, it can forward datagrams directly to the CN via t h e G W n o d e , as long as it pays t h e SP for network usage in the access network. The MN indicates in t h e mobility header t o the G W node that it is sending voice data in the payload f i c l d t o t h e C N , a n d a t t a c h e s t h e required n u d e r of payment tokens with each datagram. I n t e r m e d i a t e routing n o d e s a r e able t o verify t h e authenticity of t h e d a t agrams prior to making a routing decision. If t h e MN exhausts t h e c u r r e n t chain, it can immediately start using the next available subchain of the UOBT. 
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DISCUSSION
O u r solution provides a means of allowing real-time payment and authenticated router updates in the access network. A micropayment scheme using bash functions and offline broker contact allows the solution to be efficient and scalable. To aid performance, digital signatures are only used at call setup and to generate the broker commitment. Subsequent authentication and accounting procedures are achieved using only hash tokens. The proposed protocol is generic enough to easily he integrated in any of the micromobility schemes we have studied. We make use o f an additional mobility lieader that is access-network-specific.
T h e gateway node in the access network removes this header prior to any datagrams being forwarded onto the core network. On the reverse path the datagrams are delivered without modification to-the MN. This ensures that existing Internet applications can work without any modifications.
With the exception of purchasing payment chains and location management procedures, the overhcad incurred by including the mobility header in each datagram is 16 bytes for the hash value (assuming we make use of MD5 to generate the suhchains) and another 8 bytes to represent the payload type, UOBT identifier, subchain number, and hash number. Thus, a total of 24 bytes is addcd as part of the mobility header within the access network. In addition, each ronter in the access network must also maintain an authentication cache it must consult prior to making any modifications to the route cache.
Registering the care-of address a t a location management server is an optional feature, which may or may not be used by all users in the system. A user may only wish to access data services or make outgoing calls from hislher MN, in which case heishe is not ohliged to register hisiher current CoA with a location management server. Only if a user wishes to be reachable for incoming calls does helshe need t o update hislher care-of address periodically at a location server, and pay for the privilege.
Hash chains are of a finite length, and there is a possibility that a node may run out of hash values during a session. In the case of a UOBT, if thcre are unused suhchains, the user can switch to the next subchain immediately. If there are no further subchains available, it can result in the dropping of a connection. This is particularly true for real-time communications such as voice telephony or videoconferencing where the source may transmit a large number of datagrams during a session. However, this applies to all payment protocols that have a fixed amount in the user's purse. When a mobile node moves between access networks, any ongoing calls may he dropped. This is due to the fact that the MN will need to register in the new network and obtain another I P address. I n addition, it will require new provider-specific payment tokens tu pay for network usage. If, on t h e o t h e r h a n d , an MN already possesses valid payment tokens from a prior visit, it may use them instead. If the user was involved in a data call such as accessing a Web server, there may he a small delay before the connection can be resumed. However, for voice calls a new connection will have to bc set up with the destination node.
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CONCLUSION
With the widespread use of PDAs and the availability of low-cost wireless networking hardware, there has bccn considerable growth in the number of wireless access networks. Currently such networks are operated by individual organizations, and are usually closed to users who belong to other network operators or organizations.
One of the reasons for this is that such closed networks d o not have any AAA provisioning policies in place, and thus cannot deal with nodes with which they do not have a pre-established security relationshib.
With a large number of network operators and service providcrs, it is necessary to guarantee payment and remove any complex trust relationships involved in billing. We identify a number of problems with t h e current AAA mechanisms for Mobile-IP-based access networks. The desirable properties of an authentication and accounting system are then drawn up, and a solution that securely achieves those goals is proposed. T o allow for an efficient solution, with minimal computational costs during packet authentication, a scheme based on hash chain trees is used. The use of hash chain trees is an advantage over ordinary hash chains; it allows efficienttgeneration and storage of hashvalues within a mobile device, which may have limited storage capacity. W e have also kept the number of cryptographic keys required to a minimum, while allowing for fast verification of the authentication data carried within thc datagrams.
-Wc believe that in the future there will be a large number of micro-and picoccllular mobile networks based on IP, which will provide the next generation of telecommunications services to a vcry large user population. These networks will require secure and scalable AAA provisioning. Our solution provides an efficient means of authentication of signaling messages and accounting of resourccs in such networks.
